Keith B. Ellis et al v. Karl B. Hale et al : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1962
Keith B. Ellis et al v. Karl B. Hale et al : Brief of
Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Milton V. Backman; Attorneys for Respondents;
Adam M. Duncan; Ronald N. Boyce; Attorneys for Appellants;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Ellis v. Hale, No. 9537 (Utah Supreme Court, 1962).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3907
IN 'THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KEITH B. ELLIS and VIRGINIA 
ELLIS, LOEL T. HEPWORTH and 
CONNIE JO M. HEPWORTH, 
ADA~f M. DUN·CAN and SHIR-
LENE II. DUNCAN, RICHARD B. 
BURTON and ANN B. BURTON, 
{J,; ..... · .. ~ .~ :.~1TY UTAH 
APR9 1962 
Plaintiffs and .Appellants, 
-:vs.-
KARL B. HALE and DELSA G. 
HALE, ROY A. BARRETT and 
RUTH R. BARRETT, J. TH~- g 
DORE ELDERS, JR., and LOISi-.JI. ~ 
ELDERS, RALPH D. FISHER 'and 
BARBARA H. FISHER, LEGRAND 
Case No. 9537 
P. BACKMAN and MILTON V. 
BACK!fAN, d.b.a. BACKMAN AB~- "'' 
STRACT AND TITLE ·COMPANY,--· 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Appeal from Judgment of the 
,-, 1 . 1962 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah 
RoN. RAY VANCoTT, JR., Judge 
MILTON V. BACKMAN 
··--------.......q 
ADA~f ni. DUNCAN 
RONALD N. BOY·CE 
351 So. State St. 
Hanson, Baldwin & Allen 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
.Attorneys for Respondents. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for .Appellants 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  




Point 1 . ........ .......... ..... ... ... ..... .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Point 2 ··············-···········-···············-······--···············-·············----·· 5 
Point .3 .....•.••..............•................................................................ 11 
Point 4 ................................................................................... . 
Point 5 ·········-···-···--······--·--···········-·-·--·-·--··········-------·········-····· 13 
Point 6 ············-······················--------·-········---······-···--··········--·--· 14 
Point 7 -----·······-·····--·--·······-··-···-·············-···--·····------------------------ 15 
CASES 
Akers v. Chicago, St. Paul R.R., 5'8 Minn. 540, 60 N.W. 669...... 9 
Bros. v. Boise City R.R., 5 Idaho 695 ........................................ 15 
Davis Stock Co. v. Hill, 2 U. 2d 20----------------------------·-··········-------- 11 
Hocking v. Title Ins. & Tr. Co, 37 Cal. 2d 644, 234 P2d 625, 
40 ALR 2d 1238 ........ --------------------------------------------------------·-····-- 13 
Knight v. So. Pac. R. Co., 52 U. 42, 172 P. 689 ............................ 15 
Langlois v. Reese, 10 U 2d 272, 351 P2d 638................................ 6 
The Coast Mutual Bldg. Loan v. Security Title Ins. Co., 
14 Cal. App. 2d 225, 57 P. 2d 1392........................................ 13 
T·EXTS 
Devlin on Deeds, 3rd Ed., Vol 2, Sec. 1013a.............................. 15 
Prosser, Torts, 2nd Ed ......................... ----·········--······-------------------7, 8 
Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed. Vol. 6, Sec. 327 4, 
p 445 -... ------------.-.. ---.--.--.----.---- .. ----------.---.-- .. --.-.---- ... -- ....... -.. --.--- 15 
UTAH RULES CIVIL PRO·CEDURE 
Rule 9 (b) ______________ --------------------------------- .. -------------------------------------.. 11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN ITHE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
1\l~~[TH I~. ELI.JIS and \'IRGlNI~\ 
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BRIEF OF RF.JSPONDENTS 
Respondents agree 'Yith the stateinent of the nature 
of the case, \Yith the statPd disposition of same, the relief 
sought a:-.; ~et forth in appellants' brief, and that the 
state1nent of facts substantially recites the allegations 
contained in the second an1ended complaint. 
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As a further statement the attention of the Honor-
able Court is directed to the fact that defendants Karl 
B. Hale and Delsa G. Hale, his wife, who owned the prop-
erties affected by this action, did on October 15th, 1958 
make gifts to three of their children, two of whom are 
named as grantee:s in deeds of properties described in 
paragraphs 14th and 15th. These deeds were made and 
delivered by Karl B. Hale and his wife following a pat-
tern adopted by them in reducing their estate, by each 
year conveying properties to their children. (R. 14). De-
fendants Karl B. Hale and Delsa G. Hale had no right, 
title or interest in and to the property described in the 
deeds, the subject of this action, after the deeds here-
inabove mentioned were delivered to their children. 
Defendants Fishers and Elders were parties to but 
one deed each, therefore there could be no violation of 
any law or ordinance on the part of these defendants. 
None of defendants have been found guilty of 
violating any la\v or ordinance. X or does it appear fron1 
the pleadings that any one of the defendants made any 
statement to induce plaintiffs to act, "'"hich statement "~as 
false, but plaintiff~ rely on that "~hich they claim was 
an on1ission on the part of defendants to ad-vise plaintiffs 
of the status of the prop-erties. 
As to defendants Le Grand P. Backlnan and ~Iilton 
l'". Backman, dba Baelrman Abstract and Title Company 
it is alleged that a prelin1inary title report \Vas issued by 
said eon1pany and that it \Yas not di8elosed by the report 
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that the property \vas not \\·ithin a recorded subdivision. 
Appellants do not charge that the title co1npany certified 
to a description of property as being within a subdivision. 
Defendant Ada1n ~1. Duncan conferred 'vith the Plan-
ning and Zoning l~o1nmission in co1npany \vith defendant 
l(arl B. llale. Duncan had no conversation with Karl B. 
Hale p-rior to Duncan':-; having acquired title to the prop-
erty (R. 34). 
The plat of the proposed subdivision does not bear 
the signature of anyone representing themselves to be 
the own·ers of the property. 
Plaintiffs do not charge that they have been dis-
turbed in possession of the property described in the 
deeds, their only complaint is that they were denied 
building permits. 
The property, the subject of this action, fronts on a 
present county road. 
ARGlJ~lENT 
POINT I. 
THE SECOND AlVIENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO 
STATE A CLAIM AGAINST RESPONDENTS UPON WHICH 
RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. 
It cannot be determined from the con1plaint "\vhether 
appellants rely on acts of fraud or misrepresentation on 
the part of defendants-respondents, or 'vhether appellants 
rely on breach of warranty of title. If appellants rely 
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on fraud then under Rule 9b URCP appellants are re-
quired to state the acts of fraud on which they rely with 
particularity. This appellants have not done. If appel-
lants rely on breach of warranty of title as against re-
spondents who "\\7ere grantors in the deeds, the subject 
of this action, then it is necessary to read into the war-
ranty deed that which the statute does not imply. Appel-
lants have not alleged facts sufficient to sho'v the viola-
tion of any ordinance relied upon or of the violation of 
any law, nothing but bare legal conclusions. 
There is no allegation of failure of title or of appel-
lants having been disturbed in possession, neither is 
there any allegation that the title is encumbered. The 
only allegation is that appellants have been unable to 
obtain building permits to construct homes on the prop-
erties described in the deeds. 
Appellants allege the deeds refer to lots in :Jiount 
Olympus Park No. 5. The deeds on "yhich appellants rely 
and base their action do not recite any subdivision but 
on the contrary each deed contains a meets and bounds 
description as alleged by appellants in paragraphs 15th, 
16th, and 17th of the second an1ended con1plaint. There-
fore it is clear there is nothing before the court bearing 
out the allegations that the deeds n1ade reference to or 
caused reference to be 1nade to a certain purported plan 
or plat by a subdiv"ision, to-"yit, .Jlount Olyn1pus Park 
No. 5. 
As to the allegations purporting to state a cause of 
action against Defendants Barkman~ appellants allege 
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that defendant ~Tilton \'. Baclnnan prepared all of the 
deeds. That this defendant "·a~ a\Yare that Duncan 
thought he \\·as purchasing 3 building lots although said 
defendant knew that the lots \\'Pre not part of an approved 
subdivision he \vholly failed to disclose this fact to said 
Duncan. This allegation is contradictory to the allega-
tions contained in paragraphs sixteenth, seventeenth 
and eightPenth and is in conflict \Yith the descriptions 
contained in the deeds relied upon. Therefore it is ap-
parent Duncan \vas on notice at all tirnes of the fact that 
the property \vas not a part of a subdivision. 
As to the allegation in paragraph 37th of the issu-
ance of ~~ Interirn Title Insurance Binders,'' it is alleged 
that the srune \\·ere delivered to Duncan by Barrett. 
There is no allegation of any privity of contract bet\veen 
Duncan and defendants, Backman Abstract & Title Co. 
The instrt1n1ents relied upon as against these defendants 
"·ere not pleaded, and subparagraphs 1, 2 and 3 there-
under contain statements not presmned to be covered by 
an Interim Title Insurance Binder. As to the other alle-
gations of the~ complaint purporting to state a cause of 
action against defendants Backn1an, the complaint con-
tains no allegations as to the description of the property 
contained in the title policy purportedly issued or in the 
binder allegedly issued by defendants Backman. Neither 
is it alleged that there \v·as privity of contract be~tween 
Baclanan and any one of the plaintiffs. 
POINT II. 
The appellants, in Point II of their brief, contend 
that they state a cause of action against all of the defend-
ants named upon t\\·o theories. 
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The first of these theories is predicated upon the 
proposition that it is negligent to violate certain statutes 
and ordinances which are set forth in the appellants' 
brief. 
There is no question that the Salt Lake County Ordi-
nance set forth in the section referred to of the Utah Code 
Annotated are accurate recitations of 'vhat those statu-
tory provisions hold. It should be noted in this connec-
tion that the statutory provision referred to creates a 
violation or describes a violation as a misdemeanor. 
On Page 10 and Page 11 of the appellants' brief 
there is set forth the underlying purpose of the county 
ordinance which is stipulated therein in the broadest 
terms. In neither the county ordinance referred to nor 
the state statute is there established in so many words or 
expressly any civil action such as the appellants brought 
against any violator of the ordinance or the state statute. 
The question which arises by reason of Point A in the 
appellants' brief contending that negligence can be predi-
cated upon a violation of a statute and ordinance and 
thereby give rise to a cause of action in favor of the 
appellants and against the defendants. 
In sup·port of this proposition, the appellants refer 
to ecrtain cases ""hieh purport to hoJd that a violation 
of a erirninal statute or ordinance has been recognized 
as establishing sorne negligence as a 1natter of la·w ... Also, 
in sup·port of this proposition, is cited the case of Lang-
lois v. Reese, 10 Utah 2d 272, 331 P 2d 638. 
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The appellants' brief uses this language in referring 
to the Langlois case : 
H In the latter case (the Langlois case) this 
court indicated that if a violation of a statutP re-
sults in da1nage \vhieh the statute is designed to 
prevent a supportable rause of action exist;-;.,, 
The l~anglois case arose out of an automobile-
pedestrian accident at the intersection of State Street 
and First Avenue. The westbound automobile \vas Inak-
ing a left turn from First A venue going south on State 
Street \\'"hen the pedestrian was crossing from west to 
east, not in a crosswalk, across State Street. The essence 
of the case is that the trial court sent the question of 
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff to the 
jury on the question of whether this alleged contributory 
negligence \\'"as a proximate cause. The jury found that 
it was and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision. But 
no\vhere in the decision is any language apparent "·hich 
is susceptible of the proposition that the court indicated 
a violation of the statute or of a statute creates a support-
able cause of action. 
Also, in support of this proposition, the ap·pellants 
cite in their brief a headnote from Prosser, Torts, 2nd 
Edition. The material in Prosser, \Vhich follo\vs this 
headnote contains some decisions \Vhich seem to support 
the proposition that the violation of a criminal statute, 
\\'"ill create a civil action on the part of one who is injured 
as a result of the violation of the statute if the plaintiff 
is one of a class the statute \Yas designed to protect. 
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In connection \vith the citation to Prosser on Torts, 
2nd Edition, \vhich is rnade by appellants in their brief, 
beginning at Page 154 of the 2nd Edition, the follo\ving 
language appears under the general headnote \Yhich has 
been submitted to the court: 
"It is not every infraction of a statute or an 
ordinance which will result in civil liability. Other-
wise stated, there are statutes \Yhich are construed 
as creating no duty of conduct to"\\rard the plain-
tiff. The courts have been careful not to exceed 
the purpose \vhich they attribute to the legislature. 
This judicial self-restraint has served as an argu-
ment for those \vho contend that an action cannot 
be founded upon a duty to another; hut there is, 
of course, a special reason, in the theory of the 
separation of po"\\rers, for such reluctance to go 
beyond the legislative policy.'' 
Prosser continues on Page 155 of the 2nd Edition 
to say as follovvs : 
"In many cases the evident policy of the legis-
lature is to protect only a limited class of indi-
viduals, and the plaintiff must bring hin1Self 
within that class in order to maintain an actjon 
based on the statute." 
The purpose of the passage of the rolulty ordinance 
which is set forth in the appellants' brief is repeated 
here because of the very general language \Yhich is used. 
It reads as follo"'"s: 
"The underl~'"ing purpose and intent of this 
title is to promote the healt11, safet~~, convenienee 
and general \Yelfare of the inhabitants of the un-
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incorporated territor~T of the count~T in the 111anner 
of the subdivision of land and to encourage the 
healthful gro"'th of the county.'' 
In .... 4.kers v. Chicago, St. Paul, Jlihraukee aud Ohio 
Jfailway C1(nnpaH,IJ, 58 l\[inn. 540, 60 N.,V. 669, the follo\v-
ing state1nent, footnoted in Prosser, occurs: 
~~Even if a defendant owes a duty to someone 
else but does not o've it to the person injured, no 
action will lie. The duty must be to the person in-
jured. These principles are elementary and are 
equally applicable, whether the duty is imposed 
by positive statute or is founded on general co1n-
1non law principals." 
It is submitted that the general language employed 
in the preamble to the Salt Lake County Ordinance does 
not in express tern1s or other,vise purport to ereate in 
favor of these plaintiffs a civil cause of aetion against 
these defendants. The seeond theory advanced by the 
appellants in support of their Point II is that a negligent 
misrepresentation should give rise to the kind of eause 
of action 'vhich the appellants seek to bring here. This 
theory on the part of the appellants appears to be based 
on the proposition that the defendants, or some of them, 
either deliberately misrepresented the facts or negligently 
made representations or assertions, the truth of "~hich, 
they did not ascertain. 
The answer to this theory and contention of the ap-
pellants is simply that no representation, or misrepresen-
tation, of the kind contended for by the appellants 'Yas 
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made, nor was there any conscious withholding of in-
formation which should have been given to the appellants. 
The appellants in this regard seem to rely upon what 
they describe as an inference left by the defendants that 
the land in question was part of a valid subdivision. 
There is no sup·port for the suggestion that an inference 
was left or made that the land was part of a valid sub-
division. In this connection, also, the appellants refer to 
Prosser on Torts, 2nd Edition, Page 541, and say as 
follO"\\TS: 
HA representation made with an honest belief 
in its truth may still be negligent because of lack 
of reasonable care and ascertaining the facts, or 
in the manner of expression." 
This last statement "or in the manner of expression'' 
1s italicized in the appelants' brief. Their contention 
seen1s to be that they 'vere 1nislead by son1e sort of infer-
ence or a manner of expression or even a tone of voice. 
In this connection, it should be taken into account 
that the plaintiff "~ho con1plains most bitterly about tlris 
contended or alleged negligent 1nisrepresentation is an 
attorney, \vho had equal and Rlllple access to all of the 
information concerning the land involved as did the de-
fendants. There is no necessit~~ on the part of the defend-
ants and respondents in this action to rely upon the 
doctrine of caveat e1nptor. It seems curious that the attor-
ney to \\'"honl this propert~ .. \Yas sold n1ade no personal 
inquiry 'vith respect to its status as subdivision properly 
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or otherwise; does not contend that he even asked con-
cerning its subdivided status and then files a cause of 
action based upon inference or ''a manner of expressio." 
It is submitted to the court, based upon the foregoing 
that the appellants have not stated a cause of action which 
can be predicated upon either a violation of a statute or 
an ordinance or upon the theory of conscious or negligent 
misrepresentation because no such representations \\Tere 
ever made. 
POINT III. 
Under Appellants' Point III sub paragraph ~\-­
Fraud, they say the facts alleging the fraud are set out 
'vith particularity as required by Rule 9(b) URCP, and 
cite Davis Stock Co. v. Hill, 2 U. 2d 20 noteing that the 
true facts must be alleged unless they appear obvious 
from the pleadings. The lower court in sustaining re:-
spondents' motion determined that the allegations of 
fraud were insufficient and rightly so. Let us examine 
the complaint as to the allegations of fraud. Unde:r para-
graph lOth appellants allege the lots contained fewer than 
the minimum number of square feet allowed by the terms 
of the cited ordinance. It is apparent appellants knew or 
should have known from the meets and bounds descrip·-
tion the area the lots contained. 
In paragraph 11 appellants alle:ge that title to all of 
the properties \Yas in Hales and that the four lots were 
transferred to other members of the Hale family prior to 
execution of deeds to Barrett (one of the defendants), 
Duncan and Ellis. Then in paragraph 12th it is alleged 
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that in the spring of 1959, I-Iales, Elders and Fisher con-
veyed to Barrett three lots identified as 1, 2, and 3, in 
consideration of or exchange of some Utah County prop-
erty, and under paragraph 13th it is alleged that Barrett 
and Hale deeded the three lots to Duncan and that certain 
of the other defendants (not nan1ed) joined in the deeds. 
The only allegations of fraud are contained in See-
ond Claim wherein appellants recite certain statements 
purportedly made to defendant Barrett and then restated 
by Barrett to Duncan. The state1nents allegedly made 
even if not hearsay as to Hales are not such statements as 
'vill give rise to an action of fraud. 
As to representations clain1ed to have been made 
by Backmans under the Interin1 Title Report, as hereto-
fore state,d, there are no allegations of any privity of 
contract bet,veen then1 and Duncan. Keither are the in-
struments or any provisions thereof pleaded. The docu-
ments are not in evidence nor are they attached to the 
pleading as exhibits. There are no allegations to the ef-
fect that the title oompany failed to certify to that 'vhich 
is a matter of record, neither do appellants allege that 
the title company certified to the property as being a 
part of a subdivision. 
There are no allegations to the effect that it 'vas 
represented to Duncan or to his grantees by Hales that 
the property ,, ... as a part of a dedicated subdivision. 
At page 23 of appellants' brief they say kno,Yledge 
of the falsity· to Barrett is not specifically pleaded, but 
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it need not be. Tf appellants have stated a cause of action 
against Barrett for fraud it is not i1nputed to the other 
defendants and Barrett is not d.efending the case. 
POINT \T 
The contplaint contains no allegations against Back-
Inans to the effect that they insured title to a property 
described as a part of subdivision. As stated heretofore, 
appellants do not so much as set out any provision of the 
Interim Title Report . .£-~ll that appellants do is to allege 
Backmans did not disclose the lots were not subdivision 
lots. The description contained in the reports will show 
a meets and bounds description and that no reference is 
made to any subdivision. Appellants refer to defects in 
the title reports but fail to point out the particular in 
'vhich the defect appears or just what the defect is, they 
allege the report did not point out that the property was 
subdivision building lots without specifying any provision 
of the report requiring the title company to do so. 
The case of Hocking v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 37 Cal. 
2d 644, 23-! P2d 625, 40 ALR 2d 1238 is favorable to de-
fendants Backman. Therein the court said in quoting 
from The Coast Jlfutual Bldg. Loan Assn. v. Security 
Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 1-± Cal. App. 2d 225, 57 P:Z(l 1392: 
"Not only the provisions of the policy as a 
'vhole, but also the exceptions to the liability of 
the insurer, must be construed so as to give the 
insured the protection \Yhich he reasonably had 
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a right to expect, and to that end doubts, ambigui-
ties, and uncertainties arising out of the language 
used in the policy must be resolved in his favor." 
Without the policies relied upon being pleaded or 
without pleading the provisions thereof appellants have 
not pleaded any cause of action as against Backmans. 
The allegations contained in the complaint are· nothing 
but bare legal conclusions of the pleaders. 
Appellants charge defendants ,,~ith breach of \~Var­
ranty. It appears that Barrett is inadvertently referred 
to in the introductory paragraph of app·ellants' brief as a 
plaintiff. 
Appellants have not alleged facts constituting any 
breach of warranty of title. The argument on pages 29 
and 30 of their brief is not supported by the pleadings, 
on the contrar~~ it is clearly evident from the allegations 
as contained in paragraphs 16th, 17th and 18th that no 
reference to any plat or map is contained in the deeds. 
N o\vhere in the pleading does it appear that the grantee 
or their successors in interest have been disturbed in 
possession of the property covered by the deed. Appel-
lants have cited no authority holding they had no right 
to convey the property covered by the deeds, and as to 
there not being the "quantity and quality'' purported to 
be conveyed the deeds being meets and bounds description 
elearly disclose the area covered. Parol evidence could 
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not be introduced to alter or to explain same as there is 
no ambigUity in the deeds. In/( night v. So. Pac. R. Co., 52 
U. 42, 56, 172 P 689 the court said a parol agreement in no 
event runs with the land. 
The deeds contain a complete description and the no-
tation of Lot number adds nothing to the description and 
it will not be considered. 
In 2 Devlin on Deeds, Third Ed., Vol. 2 at section 
1013a, the law is stated as follows : 
"If the land conveyed can be identified by 
the other calls of the description an impossible 
or senseless course will not be considered. Citing 
Brose v. Boise City R.R., 5 Idaho 695." 
Se.e also Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed. Vol. 
6,Sec.3274,p.445. 
POINT VII. 
Appellants contend that the action against the grant-
ors in the deeds, the subject of the action, and that plead-
ed against defendants Backman in their having issued 
Interim Title Re·ports arise out of the same transaction, 
occurrence or series of transactions or occurences. It 
is contended that the issuance of a title report on a tract 
of land is not the transaction or occurance contemplated 
by the rules. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
BACJ()LAX, BACK~lAN & 
CLARK 
Attorneys for Respondents, Karl 
B. Hale, Delsa G. Hale, Ralph 
D. Fisher, Barbara H. Fisher, 
LeGrand P. Backnzan, J!ilton 
11 • Backn1an, dba Backnzan Ab-
stract and Title Co. 
ARTHlTR A. ALLEN", JR., 
Attorney for Respondents, J. 
Theodore EldersJ Jr., and Lois 
H. Elders. 
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